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PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE 
CLEANUP: AN EXAMINATION OF CERCLA 
SECTION 107 
David A. Rich* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The combination of technological improvements in the methods of 
manufacturing! and implementation of federal and state laws con-
trolling air and water pollution2 has resulted in the creation of 
greater amounts of solid waste. 3 Most of this waste is disposed of on 
land in open dumps and sanitary landfills. 4 Such disposal methods 
are dangerous because toxic chemicals may leak from waste sites 
and contaminate the public water supply.5 In response to the growing 
problem of hazardous waste disposal, Congress enacted two major 
pieces of legislation: the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
of 1976 (RCRA),6 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).7 
RCRA and CERCLA each focus on a different aspect of the 
hazardous waste problem. RCRA primarily focuses on the manage-
ment and regulation of hazardous waste disposal. 8 CERCLA pri-
marily focuses on the cleanup of existing hazardous waste sites. 9 
* Articles Editor, 1985-1986, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980). 
2 H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 6241-42 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 94-1491]. 
3Id. 
4 Id. at 6240. 
5 See QUARLES, FEDERAL REGULATION OF HAZARDOUS WASTES; A GUIDE TO RCRA 13-
15 (1982). 
642 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (Supp. II 1984). 
742 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982). 
8 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, supra note 2, at 4. The House committee introducing RCRA 
believed that it eliminated "the last remaining loophole in environmental law." Id. 
9 H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 6125 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 96-1016]. 
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Both statutes authorize, although RCRA to a far less extent, the 
federal government to clean up dangerous hazardous waste sites and 
to bring suit to recover the clean-up costs from the parties respon-
sible for creation of the site.1O To deter violations of the statutes, 11 
and to finance the necessary cleanup12 of hazardous waste sites, both 
RCRA and CERCLA contain criminaP3 and civil14 liability provi-
sions. The civil liability provisions of CERCLA, contained in Section 
107,15 designate categories of persons responsible for the creation of 
hazardous waste sites and subject them to liability for clean-up 
costs. 16 
This article examines the scope of liability under CERCLA section 
107, and focuses upon its application to individual, as opposed to 
corporate, defendants. The few courts to consider this issue have 
held that individuals may be proper defendants in a CERCLA suit 
for the recovery of clean-up costs. 17 In the case of corporate officers 
and employees, the corporate form has not shielded these individuals 
from liability where the government has demonstrated that the in-
dividual involved exercised personal control over, or was actually 
involved in, the treatment, transport or disposal of hazardous 
waste. 18 
Section II discusses the growing hazardous waste problem and 
the parties involved in the generation and disposal of hazardous 
waste. It examines the RCRA liability provisions regarding ongoing 
hazardous waste problems, and the provisions' limited applicability 
to the problems abandoned hazardous waste sites pose. 19 Section III 
10 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. II 1984); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607 (1982); see also infra notes 55-
105 and accompanying text. 
11 According to Terrell E. Hunt, EPA acting associate enforcement counsel for special 
litigation, the "overwhelming value" of EPA's criminal enforcement program is the message 
of deterrence it sends to private corporate officials. EPA, Justice Described as Urging Courts 
to Send More Corporate Violators to Jail, ENV'T REP. (BNA), Vol. 16, No.2, at page 45 
(May 10, 1985). 
12 Civil liability under RCRA Section 7003 and under CERCLA Section 107 serves to finance 
the abatement and cleanup of hazardous waste. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. 
13 The criminal liability provisions of RCRA may be found in 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (Supp. II 
1984). The criminal liability provisions of CERCLA may be found in 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (1982). 
14 Civil liability may be imposed under RCRA Section 7003. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp II 
1984). Civil liability may be imposed under CERCLA §§ 106-107.42 U.S.C. §§ 9606-07 (1982). 
15 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). 
16 [d. 
17 See generally United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Company 
(NEPACCO), 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Miss. 1984); United States v. Mottolo, 22 Env't Rep. 
Cas. (BNA) 1026 (D.N.H. 1984). 
18 See NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 823. 
19 "Inactive" hazardous waste sites are waste sites upon which all disposal of hazardous 
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examines the CERCLA liability provisions; it focuses particularly 
on the liability of individuals under section 107. This article concludes 
that, although CERCLA section 107 liability may be harsh when 
applied to certain individuals, such findings of liability are necessary 
to finance the cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to deter unlawful 
dumping of hazardous waste. 
II. THE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEM AND THE RCRA 
STATUTORY SOLUTION 
The New Jersey District Court in United States v. Price (Price 
1)20 described the problems of hazardous waste disposal. The Price 
I court said: 
For fundamental and deeply rooted psychological reasons, as 
well as more mundane utilitarian considerations, it is character-
istic of man to bury that which he fears and wishes to rid himself 
of. In the past, this ingrained pattern of behavior has generally 
proven harmless, and indeed, has often led man to restore to the 
earth the substances he had removed from it. In today's indus-
trialized society, however, the routine practice of burying highly 
toxic chemical waste has resulted in serious threats to the en-
vironment and to public health . . . . The dangers are especially 
acute when buried chemical wastes threaten to contaminate the 
underground aquifers upon which half the nation relies for its 
supply of drinking water. 21 
The large number of abandoned and inactive hazardous waste sites 
makes the problem of controlling hazardous waste more difficult. 22 
It is difficult both to determine what parties are responsible for this 
past disposal, and to locate these parties. 23 Inactive hazardous waste 
sites are especially dangerous because of the danger that toxic leak-
age from a waste site may not become apparent until long after all 
disposal activity has ceased. 24 A 1979 study conducted by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) revealed 30,000 to 50,000 in-
active and uncontrolled hazardous waste sites in the United States. 25 
waste has already occurred, and "abandoned" waste sites are sites whose owner(s) is no longer 
on the site. These terms are used interchangably throughout this article to refer to those sites 
which have been created by past disposal and which have been abandoned by the owner(s). 
20 United States v. Price (Price n, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), affirmed 688 F.2d 204 
(3d Cir. 1982). 
21 [d. at 1057. 
22 See supra note 19. 
23 See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, supra note 9, at 17. 
24 See Price I, 523 F. Supp. at 1063-66. 
25 H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, supra note 9, at 17. 
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The EPA determined that 1,200 to 2,000 of these sites presented a 
serious risk to the public health.26 The study concluded that the 
cleanup of just these sites would cost from $13.1 to $22.1 billion. 27 
The tremendous cost of cleaning up hazardous waste sites raises 
questions as to who should bear the financial burden for such cleanup. 
RCRA and CERCLA authorize, to differing extents,28 the federal 
government to clean up hazardous waste sites and to then bring suit 
to recover-the clean-up costs from parties responsible for the creation 
of the waste site. 29 Under both statutes the potentially liable parties 
include: (1) owners and operators of hazardous waste facilities;30 (2) 
transporters of hazardous waste;31 and (3) those persons who arrange 
for the transport of hazardous waste32 (usually generators of hazard-
ous waste).33 These various parties could include employees as well 
as corporate officers. 34 
Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
of 1976 (RCRA)35 to address the growing problem of hazardous waste 
disposal. RCRA authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency 
Administrator to promulgate regulations for the management of 
hazardous waste. 36 RCRA has been referred to as a "cradle to grave" 
26 [d. 
27 See United States v. Wade (Wade II), 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
28 See supra notes 6-16 and accompanying text. 
29 [d.; 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (Supp. II 1984); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). 
30 See infra note 90. 
31 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1982). 
32 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1982). 
33 City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Company, 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 (E.D.Pa. 
1982). 
34 See NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 847-48. "Owners and operators of a facility" could 
encompass many possible defendants because of CERCLA's broad definition of the term 
"facility." A "facility" is defined by CERCLA as " ... any site or area where a hazardous 
substance has been deposited, stored of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located .... " 42 
U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1982). Under this definition, a facility may be both the generation and the 
disposal site for the hazardous waste. Therefore, there may be numerous "owners and oper-
ators" involved in a single CERCLA action. 
35 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (Supp. II 1984). 
36 42 U.S.C. § 6907(a) (Supp. II 1984). RCRA provides for criminal and civil penalties to 
help enforce its regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (Supp. II 1984). Section 3008(a) of the Act 
establishes civil penalties for non-compliance with administrative orders issued because of 
violations of RCRA regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3)(Supp. II 1984). Pursuant to section 
3008(a), persons violating EPA regulations enacted pursuant to RCRA who fail to take 
corrective action after an administrative order may be liable for a civil penalty of up to $25,000 
per day of continued non-compliance. Section 3008(d) specifies the criminal penalties of the 
Act. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (Supp. II 1984). As amended by the 1984 legislation, this section 
provides criminal penalties for any person who knowingly transports, or causes transportation 
of, hazardous waste to a facility which does not have a permit, knowingly treats or disposes 
of hazardous waste without having obtained a permit, or knowingly violates the recordkeeping 
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piece of legislation37 because it authorizes the regulation of hazardous 
waste from the time of its creation to the time of its disposal. 38 The 
purpose of RCRA is to "promote the protection of health and the 
environment and to conserve valuable material and energy 
resources"39 by, among other things, "prohibiting future open dump-
ing on the land and requiring the conversion of existing open dumps 
to facilities which do not pose a danger to the environment or to 
health. "40 
One of RCRA's most important provisions is the imminent hazard 
authority it grants the EPA in section 7003.41 Section 7003 authorizes 
the EPA to seek a judicial order to restrain toxic leaks from hazard-
ous waste sites.42 Courts have construed section 7003 to hold indi-
vidual defendants liable for the cost of abating the leakage of chem-
icals from such sites to the extent that such leakage poses an 
imminent danger to the public health or to the environment.43 Con-
and reporting requirements established by the Act. For convictions for transporting or sending 
hazardous waste to facilities operating without permits, or for the unlawful disposal, treat-
ment, or storage of hazardous waste, a maximum fine of $50,000 for each day of violation and/ 
or a maximum prison sentence of five years may be imposed. Violators of RCRA's record-
keeping provisions are subject to a maximum fine of $50,000 for each day of violation and/or 
a maximum prison sentence of two years. The penalties under 3008(d) are doubled after a 
person's first conviction. 
In addition, Section 3OO8(e) provides that persons who violate RCRA provisions who know 
that they are "plac[ing] another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury" 
may face a maximum fine of $250,000 and/or a maximum prison sentence of 15 years. 42 
U.S.C. § 6928(e) (Supp. II 1984). If an organization is convicted of "knowing endangerment" 
the maximum fine is $1 million. [d. 
37 See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, supra note 9, at 17. 
38 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (Supp. II 1984). 
39 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (Supp. II 1984). 
40 42 U.S.C. § 6902(3) (Supp. II 1984). 
4142 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. II 1984). 
42 [d. This kind of imminent hazard provision is commonly found in environmental statutes. 
Other imminent hazard provisions that Congress has included in environmental statutes are: 
Section 1431 of the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (1976); Section 504(a) of the 
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (Supp. IV 1980); Section 303 of the Clean Air Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 7603 (Supp IV 1980); and Section 106(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982). 
43 See Price I, 523 F. Supp. at 1071-72, where previous owners of a hazardous waste site 
were held liable for the governmental cleanup of "lechate contamination that [had] . . . ema-
nated from the landfill." [d. at 1071. Though the issue of individual liability was not raised, 
the defendants were held liable in both their individual and incorporated capacities. See id. at 
1055-73. But see United States v. Wade (Wade I), 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982), where 
the court expressed, in dicta, the opinion that the "current leaking of previously dumped 
waste does not constitute 'disposable' under section 7003 . . .. " It should be noted, however 
that the Wade I decision also construed CERCLA section 106(a) in an extremely narrow 
fashion which has subsequently been criticized. See NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 839-40, n.17. 
In 1980, section 7003 was ammended to apply to situations where the leakage of hazardous 
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gress amended section 7003, along with other provisions of RCRA, 
in 198044 and again in 1984.45 The amendments to section 7003 extend 
its application to hazardous waste sites which may present an im-
minent hazard46 (as opposed to is presenting) and to those parties 
who have contributed47 (in addition to those who are contributing) 
to the disposal of hazardous waste. 48 
Prior to the 1984 amendments, which strengthened its provisions, 
section 7003 did not adequately address the problems hazardous 
waste sites pose. Courts were reluctant to interpret RCRA section 
7003 broadly because its focus, like the rest of RCRA, was prospec-
tive. 49 The drafters of RCRA intended the legislation to regulate 
wastes from a site may present (as opposed to is presenting) an imminent and substantial 
endangerment. 42 u.s.c. § 6973 (Supp. II 1984). 
44 PUB. L. 98-482 § 25. 
45 PUB. L. 98-616 § 402-04 (1984). 
46 PUB. L. 98-482 § 25. 
47 PUB. L. 98-616 §§ 402-04 (1984). 
48 The number of actors who could serve as defendants under RCRA Section 7003 had been 
limited by an often strict judicial construction of who could be responsible under that section 
as a person "contributing to" a release of hazardous waste. See Wade I, 546 F. Supp. at 790. 
But see Price I, 523 F. Supp. at 1069-74. Courts had been reluctant to impose Section 7003 
liability upon persons contributing to a release of hazardous waste whose activity had occurred 
entirely in the past, because, as aforementioned, RCRA is directed at ongoing, rather than 
past activity. See Wade I, 546 F. Supp. at 788-92; NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 833-37. Some 
courts, in fact, had limited Section 7003's applicability to present owners of sites, who would 
have had the power to comply with an injunction. Wade I, 546 F. Supp. at 792; United States 
v. Vertac Chemical Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980); United States v. Midwest 
Solvents Recovery Services, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ind. 1981). But see Price 1,523 F. 
Supp. at 1072-73. No court had construed Section 7003 to confer liability upon past non-
negligent off site generators or transporters of hazardous waste. See Wade I, 546 F. Supp. at 
790. Since courts had been reluctant to impose Section 7003 liability upon those parties whose 
past activities contributed to a present hazardous waste problem, Section 7003 did not fully 
reach responsible parties to pay for the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste sites, as all 
disposal of waste at these sites had occurred in the past. 
In 1980, Congress amended RCRA in order to enlarge the EPA's authority to use the 
imminent hazard provisions of Section 7003 to cover situations involving inactive hazardous 
waste sites. PUB. L. No. 96-482 § 25, 94 STAT. 2348 (1980). Under the 1980 amendments the 
EPA may seek injunctive relief not only where unsafe disposal "is" presenting a hazard, but 
where such disposal "may present" a hazard. Id. The legislative history reveals that the intent 
of Congress in enacting the 1980 amendments was to enable the EPA to remedy the effects 
of unsound past disposal practices. H.R. REP. No. 191, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1979). The 
EPA was specifically urged to use section 7003 to address the problem created by "abandoned 
sites as well as active ones." I d. 
In 1984 Congress further amended section 7003 as part of a number of amendments to 
RCRA, to attach liability, with some limitations, to parties responsible for the past disposal 
of hazardous waste. PUB. L. No. 98-616, 98 STAT. 3267 (1984). 
49 Price I, 523 F. Supp. at 1070-71; Wade I, 546 F. Supp. at 788-790. But note that in spite 
of § 7003's language, which was in the present tense, courts had held that prior owners of 
waste sites could be held liable under its provisions. Price I, 523 F. Supp. at 1072; United 
States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1108-09 (S.D. Ga. 1982). The Reilly 
court held that RCRA Section 7003 could be invoked against prior owners of inactive hazardous 
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ongoing hazardous waste practices, not to clean up past disposal 
sites. 50 Because section 7003 was prospective in nature, it did not 
address the problems of abandoned hazardous waste sites. 51 
Section 7003 did not grant the EPA the authority to clean up 
abandoned waste sites,52 nor did it impose liability upon a sufficient 
number of responsible parties. 53 These deficiencies were particularly 
significant because site owners and waste transporters connected 
with past dumping were often insolvent before the site became a 
recognized danger. 54 Although section 7003 authorized the EPA to 
restrain leakage from a hazardous waste site, it did not authorize a 
general cleanup of hazardous waste sites. 55 Only in cases where there 
was active leakage from a waste site did courts hold that RCRA 
applied. 56 Once the leaking was alleviated, however, the problem 
was no longer "ongoing," and further government cleanup was no 
longer authorized under RCRA.57 Because the dangers inactive sites 
pose may not become readily apparent until long after all disposal 
has ceased, section 7003 did not provide the EPA with the clean-up 
authority it needed to remove potentially dangerous hazardous waste 
sites. 58 
III. THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, 
COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (CERCLA) 
After Congress enacted RCRA in 1976, Congress and the Amer-
ican public became more aware of the magnitude of the problems 
waste sites. Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1108-09. The court relied upon RCRA's legislative 
history which revealed that Congress intended the phrase "contributing to" disposal to be 
interpreted liberally, and that Congress realized that past acts could be contributing to a 
present endangerment and intended those acts to be within the ambit of the act. [d. 
50 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (Supp. II 1984). 
51 See Bulk Distribution Centers Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (S.D. Fla. 
1984); Wade [, 546 F. Supp. at 790. The Price [ court held that RCRA could apply to past 
hazardous waste sites, but only to the extent that they posed an imminent hazard. Price [, 
523 F. Supp. at 1070-7l. 
52 See Price I, 523 F. Supp. at 1070. 
63 Courts had been reluctant to impose Section 7003 liability upon past "off-site" generators 
and transporters of hazardous waste. See Wade I, 546 F. Supp. at 790 ("no court has yet 
construed section 7003 to be applicable to past off site generators"); NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 
at 837 (Section 7003 does not impose liability upon non-negligent off site generators and 
transporters). 
54 S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980). 
55 [d. The Price [ court stated that " ... section 7003 was essentially intended to allow the 
administration to prevent future harm, not cure past ills . . . . The statute does not authorize 
a general cleanup of dormant waste disposal sites, but ... the Government may rely upon it 
to prevent further harm to the environment." Price I, 523 F. Supp. at 1070-7l. 
56 See Price I, 523 F. Supp. at 1071. 
S7 [d. 
68 Cf. Wade I, 546 F. Supp. at 790. 
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inactive hazardous waste sites pose. 59 This was particularly true 
after the Love Canal in N ew York and similar waste sites gained 
public attention. 60 To address this growing problem, Congress has, 
on several occasions, amended RCRA to strengthen its enforcement 
provisions. 61 Congress' most significant legislative step to address 
the problem, however, was passing the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CER-
CLA).62 
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to facilitate the cleanup of 
hazardous waste sites as well as to provide the necessary financing. 63 
CERCLA directly addresses the problem of inactive hazardous 
waste sites and authorizes the cleanup of those sites. 64 Congress 
intended to establish "a comprehensive response and financing mech-
anism to abate and control the vast problems associated with aban-
doned and inactive hazardous waste sites. "65 
CERCLA provides the EPA66 with a variety of regulatory tools 
to protect the public and the environment from the release of haz-
59 See NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 834-35. 
60 Id. At Love Canal, Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corporation had dumped 21,800 tons 
of toxic wastes, including dioxin, into the canal. Gruson, Lindsey, Ex-Love Canal Families 
Get Checks, The New York Times, February 20, 1985, p.81. Years after the disposal, residents 
of the Love Canal neighborhood began to suffer physical injuries ranging from a variety of 
cancers and mental retardation to persistent rashes and migraine headaches. A lawsuit brought 
by former residents against the company was recently settled for $20 million. Id. 
61 PUB. L. No. 95-609, 92 STAT. 3079 (1978); PUB. L. No. 96-482, 94 STAT. 2334 (1980); 
PUB. L. No. 98-616, 98 STAT. 3267 (1984). 
62 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982). 
63 See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, supra note 9, at 17-18. 
CERCLA, which contained a $1.6 billion Superfund to finance the cleanup of dangerous 
hazardous waste sites, was due to expire in 1985. On September 26, 1985, the Senate passed 
a bill (S51) to reauthorize CERCLA and to increase the Superfund to $7.5 billion for five 
years. This fund would be raised by imposing a broad based tax on industry, a tax which the 
Reagan administration has threatened to veto. Senate Passes $7.5 Billion Superfund Bill 
with Tax Administration Threatened to Veto,16 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 22, at 931 (September 
27, 1985). 
Similiarly, the House of Representatives passed a bill (HR 2005, formerly HR 2817) which 
would reauthorize the Superfund and sharply increase its tax on basic chemicals and oil. The 
House bill would increase the Superfund to $10.3 billion. The House-Senate conference on 
Superfund was expected after Christmas 1985, and a final bill is expected to go to the President 
in early February, at the earliest. House Passes $10 Billion Superfund Bill After Voting 
Heavy Increase in Chemical Tax, 16 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 33, at 1567 (December 13,1985). 
Environmentalists have applauded the House bill, which for the first time would set mandatory 
cleanup schedules and in most cases require cleanups to meet environmental regulations and 
standards, provisions not contained in the Senate measure. Id. 
64 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982). 
65 H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, supra note 9, at 22. 
66 "Although the Act grants most of the substantial authority to the President, he has 
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ardous waste. 67 A $1.6 billion "Hazardous Substance Response Trust 
Fund,"68 known as the "Superfund, "69 was established to finance 
cleanup of hazardous waste sites. 70 Section 10471 of CERCLA au-
thorizes the EPA to clean up hazardous waste sites72 using the 
"Superfund,"73 and then to seek cost recovery from responsible par-
ties pursuant to section 107.74 Section 10675 authorizes the federal 
government to seek injunctive relief where there is an imminent and 
substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare due to the 
actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance. 76 
delegated these and other Superfund implementation authority to the EPA, the Coast Guard, 
and various other agencies." NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 838, n.14, citing Exec. Order No. 
12316, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,237 (1981). 
67 For a more thorough discussion of the Federal government's utilization of CERCLA's 
provisions see Douge, After Voluntary Liabiiity, the E.P.A.'s Implementation of Superfund, 
11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 443, 450 (1984). 
68 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982). The Superfund is largely provided by a tax on oil and chemical 
producers. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9631, 9653; 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611 26, 4661 (1982). 
CERCLA Section 221 authorizes $44 million per year from 1981 through 1985 to be appro-
priated to the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982). Also, the 
Fund is given the authority to borrow further sums as may be necessary to carry out its 
purposes. 42 U.S.C. § 9633 (1982). 
69 See United States v. Wade (Wade II), 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1330 (1983). 
7°ld. "Amounts in the Response Trust Fund shall be available in connection with releases 
or threats of releases of hazardous substances into the environment only for purposes of 
making expenditures which are described in section III .... " 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (Supp. V 
1981). CERCLA Section 111(a) provides that the President shall use the money in the fund 
for the following purposes: (1) payment of governmental response costs incurred pursuant to 
section 104 of this title . . . ." I d. 
71 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (Supp. V 1981). 
72 CERCLA Section 104(a)(I) provides that: 
"[ w lhenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat of such 
release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or substantial threat of release into the 
environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial 
danger to the public health or welfare, the President is authorized to act, consistent with the 
national contingency plan, to remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for remedial 
action relating to such hazardous substance, pollutant or contaminant ... or take any other 
response measure consistent with the national contingency plan which the President deems 
necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the environment .... " 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9604(a)(I) (1982). 
73 CERCLA Section 111 provides that: 
"(a) The President shall use the money in the Fund for the following purposes: 
(1) payment of governmental response costs incurred pursuant to section 104 of this title 
.... " 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1982). 
74 Under CERCLA section 107, responsible parties would be: (1) the owner and operator 
of a facility; (2) persons who arranged for the transport or disposal of hazardous waste; and 
(3) persons who transported hazardous waste to be disposed. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). 
75 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1982). 
76 The term "hazardous substances" is given a broad definition in CERCLA section 101. 42 
U.S.C. § 9601 (1982). That definition states that substances designated by § 311(b)(2)(A) of 
the Federal Water Pollution Act; designated pursuant to CERCLA § 102; those having char-
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CERCLA imposes both civil and criminal penalties. Section 103 
establishes criminal penalties for failure to comply with CERCLA's 
notice and recordkeeping requirements.77 Section 106 provides for 
civil liability for failure to comply with EPA orders enacted pursuant 
to that section. 78 
Unlike RCRA, CERCLA clearly addresses the problems inactive 
hazardous waste sites pose. CERCLA specifically authorizes the 
cleanup of hazardous waste sites79 and extends liability to generators 
and transporters of toxic waste80 who were not clearly liable under 
RCRA.81 CERCLA therefore creates a comprehensive scheme for 
the cleanup of hazardous waste sites and provides for cost recovery 
from responsible parties. 
The cost of cleaning up a hazardous waste site can be enormous. 82 
Although it is desirable to clean up all dangerous waste sites, the 
question of who should bear this cost is troublesome. CERCLA funds 
waste cleanup by imposing a federal tax upon oil and chemical 
manufacturers83 to create the Superfund.84 When the EPA expends 
acteristics identified by section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act; those listed under section 
307(a) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act; listed under section 112 of the Clean Air 
Act; and those imminently hazardous and subject to action taken by the EPA Administrator 
under section 7 of the Toxic Substances Control Act, are to be considered 'hazardous sub-
stances' under CERCLA. [d. 
7742 U.S.C. § 9603 (1982). 
78 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1982). For a further discussion of section 106 liability, see Clark, Section 
106 of CERCLA: An Alternative to Superfund Liability, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 381 
(1985). 
79 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982). 
80 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). 
81 See generally, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987; Wade I, 546 F. Supp. at 787-92. 
82 For example, the clean up costs for the waste site involved in City of Philadelphia v. 
Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. at 1135, were estimated at $10 million. [d. at 1139. 
83 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 4661 (1982). 
84 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982). Note that § 107(e) provides: 
(1) No indemnification, hold harmless, or similiar agreement or conveyance shall 
be effective to transfer from the owner or operator of any vessel or facility or from 
any person who may be liable for a release or threat of release under this section, to 
any other person the liability imposed under this section. Nothing in this subsection 
shall bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless or indemnify a party to such 
agreement for any liability under this section. 
(2) Nothing in this subsection, including the provisions of paragraph (1) of this 
subsection shall bar a cause of action that a owner or operator or any other person 
subject to liability under this section, or a guarantor, has or would have by reason 
of subrogation or otherwise against any person. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (1982) (emphasis 
added). 
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money from the Superfund to clean up a hazardous waste site, the 
federal government may then bring suit to recover this expenditure 
from the parties directly responsible. 85 
Section 107 of CERCLA designates certain parties who may be 
liable for the clean-up costs of a hazardous waste site. 86 Section 107 
imposes liability87 for clean-up costs88 and damage to natural 
resources89 on: (1) past and present owners and operators90 of haz-
ardous waste facilities;91 (2) persons92 who arrange for disposal of 
hazardous substances93 to facilities (usually generators); and (3) per-
sons who transport hazardous substances to facilities from which 
there is a release94 or a threatened release of toxic chemicals that 
results in response costS. 95 These responsible parties are liable for 
three types of costs incurred as a result of a release or a threatened 
85 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. v 1981). 
86 Id. 
87 Under CERCLA section 107, the standard of liability has been held to be strict liability. 
See infra notes 108-15 and accompanying text. 
88 Clean up costs refer to what are known as "response" costs to a hazardous waste problem. 
"Response" means "remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action". 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) 
(1982). Removal actions and remedial actions are distinguishable. "Removal" means "the clean 
up or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment .... " 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601(23) (1982). "Remedial action" means those actions consistent with a permanent remedy 
taken instead of or in addition to removal actions. 42 U. S. C. § 9601(24) (1982). Thus, remedial 
actions are more directed at a long range solution to a hazardous waste problem. 
89 "Natural resources" under CERCLA means "fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, groundwater, 
drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, 
appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United States ... , any state or local govern-
ment, or any foreign government." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (1982). 
90 "Owner or operator" is defined by CERCLA as " ... in the case of an onshore facility or 
an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such facility .... [S]uch term does not 
include a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds 
indicia of ownership to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility." 42 U. S. C. 
§ 9601(20)(A) (1982). Note that CERCLA defines "owner or operator" in section 101, but 
confers liability upon "owners and operators" in section 107. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). The 
author is unaware of any significance behind this distinction. 
91 "Facility" is defined by CERCLA as "any site or area where a hazardous substance has 
been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located .... " 42 
U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1982). 
92 A "person" under CERCLA may be an "individual, firm, [or] corporation .... " 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601(21) (1982). 
93 See supra note 76. 
94 "Release" under CERCLA means "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, 
emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environ-
ment .... " 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1982). 
95 42 U. S. C. § 9607(a) (1982). 
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release of hazardous waste: (1) governmental response costs (costs 
incurred by the federal government to clean up hazardous waste 
sites);96 (2) private response costs (costs incurred by other parties97 
consistent with the National Contingency Plan),98 and (3) damages 
to natural resources. 99 
Section 107 provides limited defenses to defendants.100 A party 
otherwise liable under section 107 may escape liability if it can 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or 
threat of release of hazardous substances and resulting damages 
were caused by an act of God; 101 an act of war; 102 or an act or omission 
of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant, 
or one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual 
96 In NEPACCO, governmental response costs included: 
a) Investigations, monitoring and testing to identify the extent of danger to the 
public health or welfare or the environment, 
b) Investigations, monitoring and testing to identify the extent of the release or 
threatened release of hazardous substances, 
c) planning and implementation of response action, 
d) recovery of the costs associated with the above actions, and to enforce the 
provisions of CERCLA including the costs incurred for the staffs of the EPA and 
the Department of Justice. 
579 F. Supp. at 850. 
97 Private parties may have the right to bring suit under this section. Jones v. Inmont 
Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1425 (D.C. Ohio 1984). 
In City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982), the 
Court held that "any other person" as used in CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B) could include a party 
subject to liability under the Act. In Stepan, the city of Philadelphia cleaned up a hazardous 
waste site which it owned and then sought to recover cleanup costs and consequential damages 
from the generators and transporters of the hazardous waste. Despite the fact that the city 
could be held liable under CERCLA as the owner of the waste site, its action against the 
defendants in this case was permitted under section 107. 544 F. Supp. at 1142-43. 
98 Under CERCLA section 105, the President was given 180 days after the enactment of 
the Act to promulgate a National Contingency Plan to "establish procedures and standards 
for responding to releases of hazardous SUbstances, pollutants and contaminants .... " 42 
U.S.C. § 9605 (1982). This responsibility, as with other provisions of the act delegating 
authority to the President, was delegated to the EPA Administrator. See supra note 66. The 
CERCLA National Contingency Plan was intended to be merely a revision of the National 
Contingency Plan published pursuant to section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Act. 42 
U.S.C. § 9605 (1982). The legislative history of CERCLA indicates that the National Contin-
gency Plan was regarded as a means of assuring that responses under the Act would be both 
cost effective and environmentally sound. See City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 
544 F. SUpp. at 1144; 126 CONGo REC. S14965 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks of Sen. 
Randolph). 
99 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1982). 
100 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982). 
101 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(I) (1982). 
102 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(2) (1982). 
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relationship103 with the defendant.104 The third party exception ap-
plies only if the defendant both exercised due care with respect to 
the hazardous substance, and took necessary precautions against 
acts or omissions of the third party. 105 
A. Strict Liability 
In spite of the comprehensive nature of its hazardous waste clean-
up provisions, CERCLA's standards of liability are vague. 106 Con-
gress removed references to strict liability, and to joint and several 
liability before its final passage,107 leaving these matters for judicial 
interpretation. 
The standard of liability under CERCLA is strict liability.108 Al-
though it does not specifically mention strict liability,109 section 101, 
CERCLA's definitional section, states that liability under CERCLA 
"shall be construed to be the standard of liability which obtains under 
section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. "110 Although 
section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,111 does not 
explicitly mention strict liability,112 courts have inferred such liability 
from the language of the Act, which subjects certain parties to 
liability unless they can successfully assert one of the limited de-
fenses specified in the Act. 113 Congress' reference to section 311 in 
CERCLA is logical, because the same defenses to liability found in 
103 United States v. Argent, No. 83-0523, slip op. (D.N.M. May 4, 1984). In Argent, 
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 208-28, the court held that a CERCLA section 
107 defendant could not be excused from liability under the third party defense where the 
"act or ommission" of the third party occurred in connection with a contractual arrangement, 
in that case a lease agreement. [d. 
104 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982). 
105 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982). 
106 Cf, NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 838-39, n.15. 
107 [d. at 843-44. 
108 See NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 844; Wade II, 577 F. Supp. at 1337. 
109 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1982), which currently reads that "liability' shall be construed 
to be the standard of liability which obtains under section 1321 of Title 33," which is an 
analogous proposition. See text accompanying notes 110-15. The strict liability provision 
contained in the original Senate version of CERCLA was deleted from the statute as enacted. 
See NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 843. 
110 [d. 
111 42 U.S.C. § 1321 (Supp. v 1981). 
112 [d. 
113 United States v. MN Big Sam, 681 F.2d 432,437 (5th Cir. 1982), on petition for rehearing 
and suggestion for rehearing en bane, 693 F.2d 451, eert. denied, 452 U.S. 906; United States 
v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 621 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1980), eert denied 452 U.S. 906 
(1981); Stewart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609,613 (4th Cir. 1979). 
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section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act also appear 
in section 107 of CERCLA.114 Courts construing CERCLA have 
therefore held parties strictly liable for statutory violations. 115 
B. Joint and Several Liability 
Congress also deleted references to joint and several liability from 
the final version of CERCLA.116 The original Senate proposal spe-
cifically imposed joint and several liability, but this language was 
deleted from the final version of the bill as part of the "hastily drawn 
compromise which resulted in the enactment of CERCLA."117 Fed-
eral courts construing liability under CERCLA, however, uniformly 
have held that CERCLA permits, but does not mandate, joint and 
several liability.118 It is therefore within the discretion of the court 
to impose joint and several liability.119 Furthermore, some courts 
have held that joint and several liability should be imposed under 
CERCLA, unless the defendants can establish "that a reasonable 
basis exists for apportioning the harm against them. "120 
CERCLA's standard of strict liability, coupled with the possibility 
of joint and several liability, places a heavy burden on defendants. 
CERCLA does, however, place some constraints on the amount of 
liability that courts may impose under section 107. Section 107 lia-
bility is premised upon a governmental response121 pursuant to sec-
tion 104 and the National Contingency Plan,l22 or a response by 
another party in accordance with the National Contingency Plan. 123 
11442 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (Supp. v 1981); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982). See also, S. REP. No. 
848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980). The Senate committee which introduced CERCLA noted 
that CERCLA actually had "roots in the liability and funding provisions provided by the 
Clean Water Act of 1972." Id. 
115 NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 844. See also, City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 
544 F. Supp. at 1140, n.4. 
116 NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 844. The final version ofCERCLA was a severely diminished 
piece of compromise legislation from which a number of significant features were deleted. See 
generally Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response Com-
pensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. OF ENVTL. L. 1 (1982). 
117 NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 844. 
118 NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 844-45; U.S. v. A & F Materials Co., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 
1249, 1255-56 (D.C. Ill. 1984); Wade II, 577 F. Supp. at 1337-38. See also U.S. v. Chem-Dyne 
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810-11 (D.C.Ohio 1983). 
119 See U.S. v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802. 
120 Wade 11,577 F. Supp. at 1338. See also United States v. A & F Materials Co., Inc., 578 
F. Supp. 1249, 1253-57 (S.D.Ill. 1984). 
121 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
122 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1982). 
123 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1982). 
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Both section 104 and the National Contingency Plan impose practical 
limitations on the the extent and cost of a hazardous waste clean-up 
operation. 124 Under section 104, unless the EPA determines that 
there is an emergency or there is an arrangement to share response 
costs with a state, such costs will not continue after $1 million has 
been obligated or a period of six months has passed since the date 
of the initial response. 125 
The National Contingency Plan126 establishes procedures and stan-
dards for responding to releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, 
and contaminants. 127 These procedures include methods for discov-
ering and investigating hazardous substance disposal facilities,128 for 
determining the appropriate extent of removal of the substances, 129 
for assuring that remedial actions are cost-effective,130 and for de-
termining priorities among releases or threatened releases. 131 The 
statute and the National Contingency Plan, thus limit the extent of 
liability under CERCLA section 107. 
C. Personal Liability Under CERCLA Section 107 
As discussed earlier, CERCLA imposes liability on: (1) past and 
present owners and operators of hazardous waste facilities; (2) per-
sons who arrange for the transport of hazardous waste; and (3) 
persons who transport hazardous waste. 132 These parties include 
individuals as well as corporations. 133 The federal government has 
sought to hold both corporations and their corporate officers and 
employees responsible for the costs of hazardous waste cleanup un-
der CERCLA.134 Although individual defendants have argued that 
their actions were the actions of the corporation, thereby shielding 
124 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(c)(1), 9605 (1982). 
125 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982). 
126 The federal cleanup of hazardous waste sites must be in accordance with the National 
Contingency Plan. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1982). Although CERCLA does not specify that 
other parties undertaking hazardous waste cleanup must do so in accordance with the National 
Contingency Plan, the Act does specify that they must do so in order for liability to attach to 
responsible parties. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(b) (1982). 
12742 U.S.C. § 9605 (1982). 
128 42 U.S.C. § 9605(1) (1982). 
129 42 U.S.C. § 9605(3) (1982). 
130 42 U.S.C. § 9605(7) (1982). 
131 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (8)(a) (1982). 
132 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). 
133 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(20)(a), 9601(21) (1982). 
134 See, e.g., NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 823, Wade II, 577 F. Supp. 1326; United States v. 
Mottolo, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1026 (D. N.H. 1984). 
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them from liability under the doctrine of limited liability,135 this 
argument has not succeeded. 136 The few district courts to consider 
this issue uniformly have held that the corporate form does not shield 
individuals from personal liability where such individuals have ex-
ercised personal control over, or have actually been involved in, the 
disposal of hazardous waste. 137 
1. The Doctrine of Limited Liability 
Corporations possess rights and liabilities distinct from those pos-
sessed by their shareholders and officers. l38 The concept of limited 
liability means that the liability of a corporation, and of its owners 
and officers for "acts of the corporation," extends only to the assets 
of the corporation. 139 In fact, this limitation on liability is one of the 
primary purposes for forming a corporation. 140 
In certain situations, the corporate form is ignored and individual 
employees or corporate officers may be held liable for the actions of 
the corporation. 141 For example, corporate officers may be individ-
ually liable for participation in the tortious142 or criminaP43 activity 
of a corporation. The liability of a corporate officer is not derived 
from his "official relation" to the corporation, but results "because 
of some wrong or negligent act. . . amounting to a breach of duty. "144 
135 See NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 847 (although the court does not explicitly refer to 
limited liability, the concept is addressed). 
136 See infra notes 141-243 and accompanying text. 
137 [d. 
138 FLETCHER, 1 CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5; Wooddale Inc. 
v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 378 F.2d 627, 631 (8th Cir. 1967); Boise Cascade 
Corp. v. Wheeler, 419 F. Supp. 98, 101 (S.D.N. Y. 1976). Note, however, that a corporation 
exists only through the acts of its agents, servants, employees, officers or directors. White v. 
State, 42 Ala. App. 249, 254, 160 So.2d 496, 501 (1964). 
139 See Berman v. Riverside Casino Corp., 247 F. Supp. 243, 245 (D. Nev. 1964), afl'd 354 
F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1964). 
140 See FLETCHER, 1A CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 91, at 71; 
Roberts Fish Farm v. Spencer, 153 So.2d 718, 721 (1963); Bartle v. Home Owners Cooperative, 
Inc., 309 N. Y. 103, 106, 127 N.E.2d 832, 833 (1955). 
141 See Walkovsky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 417, 223 N.E.2d 6,7 (1966). Note that there 
is a growing tendency on the part of the courts to disregard the corporate form as a barrier 
to actions against corporate officers. See FLETCHER, supra note 140, § 41 at 388. 
142 See FLETCHER, 3A CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1137; Zubik 
v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 275 (3rd Cir. 1967); Martin v. Wood, 400 F.2d 310, 314-15 (3rd Cir. 
1968). 
143 U.S. v. Sherpex, Inc., 512 F.2d 1361, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1975), citing FLETCHER, supra 
note 142, at § 1348; C.J.S. CORPORATIONS § 931. 
144 Aubrey's Adm'r v. Stimson, 160 Ky. 563, 169 S.W. 991 (1914). The court noted that 
"[r Jeasonable businessmen would hesitate to become officers of large corporations if they were 
held to be the insurers of its subordinate employees." [d. at 992. 
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For personal liability to attach, the officer must be a participant in 
the wrongful act. 145 
In addition, corporate employees may be held personally liable for 
activities they directly controlled and supervised. 146 Courts have held 
employees who were the "guiding spirit" or the "central figure"147 in 
the damaging corporate activity liable. l48 Courts have also held cor-
porate officers who were both officers and shareholders of a closely 
held corporation149 liable for activities over which they had control. 150 
Courts have also found personal liability under the doctrine of 
"piercing the corporate veil. "151 This doctrine is based on the premise 
that the corporation is a creature of the state as its franchise is 
granted by the state for a useful and valid purpose. 152 Consequently, 
corporations may not use their franchises for unlawful purposes. 153 
The fiction of the corporate entity and the limited liability this fiction 
provides may be disregarded under circumstances where the cor-
poration is a "mere shell, serving no legitimate business purpose, 
and is used principally as an intermediary to perpetrate fraud or to 
promote injustice. "154 
Similarly, the corporate form may be disregarded where there is 
such unity of interest between the individual employee or officer and 
the corporation that the separate personalities of the parties no 
longer exist. l55 Courts have adopted this "alter ego" theory in those 
cases where the idea of the corporate entity has been used as a 
subterfuge and not to hold the individual liable would work an in-
145 Id. 
146 Rohm and Haas Co. v. Dawson Chemical Co., Inc., 557 F. Supp. 739, 818 (1983). The 
Rohm court stated: 
Id. 
It is a general rule of law supported by cases far too numerous to list that officers of 
a corporation are personally responsible for the alleged tortious conduct of the cor-
poration, if they personally took part in the commision of a tort or specifically directed 
other officers, agents or employees of the corporation to commit the act. 
147 See Donsco Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 1978). 
148 See Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d 902,907 (1st Cir. 1980). 
149 A closely held corporation or a close corporation, is one whose shares, or at least the 
voting shares, are held by a single shareholder or a closely-knit group of shareholders. 
FLETCHER, lA CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 70.1, at 3. 
150 Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 237 F.2d 428, 435 (1st Cir. 1956). 
151 Piercing the corporate veil is a judicial process whereby the court may disregard the 
usual immunity of corporate officers or entities from liability for corporate activities. See 
Walkovsky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d at 417,223 N.E.2d at 7. 
152 See Appellants' Brief at 23, NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 823. 
153 See Edgar v. Fred Jones Lincoln-Mercury, Etc., 524 F.2d 162, 166 (10th Cir. 1975). 
154 Bankers Life and Casualty Company v. Kirtley, 338 F.2d 1006, 1013 (8th Cir. 1964). 
155 See e.g., Doyn Aircraft, Inc. v. Wylie, 443 F.2d 579, 584 (lOth Cir. 1971). 
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justice. 156 To pierce the corporate veil under this "alter ego" theory, 
a plaintiff would have to show that an individual defendant "so 
dominated the corporation that it ha[d] no will or existence of its 
own."157 
In sum, although the corporate form usually shields corporate 
officers and employees from liability for "acts of the corporation," 
courts will ignore the corporate form in certain exceptional circum-
stances. In general, courts have ignored the corporate form in those 
cases where the individual involved participated in a tort or a crime 
or where the corporate form is being used to shield an individual 
from liability for fraud or where it works an injustice. 158 
2. Personal Liability of Corporate Officers Under CERCLA 
Section 107 
Courts construing liability under CERCLA section 107 uniformly 
have held that corporate officers may be held individually liable as 
"persons"159 within the meaning of the statute. 160 The liability is 
based on the officers' participation in, or direct authority for, the 
generation or disposal of hazardous waste. 161 Corporate officers may 
also be liable under CERCLA section 107 based on the alternative 
theory of piercing the corporate veil,162 Under this approach, the 
government or other plaintiff pleads that corporate officers should 
be liable for the "acts of the corporation" because the corporate form 
is a mere shell or is the "alter ego" of the individual defendants. 163 
The leading case finding personal liability under CERCLA section 
107 is United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical 
Co. (NEPACCO).l64 In NEPACCO, the court found the president 
and the vice-president of NEPACCO, as well as its hazardous waste 
166 FLETCHER, supra note 149, at § 41.10. 
157 John Mohr & Sons v. Apex Terminal Warehouse Inc., 422 F.2d 638,642 (7th Cir. 1970). 
166 See supra notes 141--57 and accompanying text. 
159 See supra note 92. 
160 See NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 823; Mottolo, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. at 1026. 
161 [d. 
162 Mottolo, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. at 1029. 
163 [d. 
164 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Miss. 1984). NEPACCO is cited as authority for construing 
personal liability under CERCLA section 107 in the following cases: U.S. v. Mottolo, 22 Env't 
Rep. Cas. 1026, 1029 (D.N.H. 1984); U.S. v. Argent Corp., No. 83-0523, slip op. at 3 (D.N.M. 
1984); U.S. v. Carolawn Co., 21 Environment Reporter-Cases (Env't Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 2124, 
2130-31 (D.S.C. 1984); N.Y. v. Shore Realty Corp., No.84-c-864, slip op. at 12 (E.D.N.Y. 
1984). 
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transporter, strictly liable under CERCLA for the clean-up costs of 
a site containing hazardous waste from the NEP ACCO plant. 165 
The NEPACCO court found the vice-president of NEPACCO li-
able under CERCLA section 107(a)(3)166 on the grounds that he was 
a "person arranging the disposal and transport of hazardous waste" 
from the NEPACCO plant to an unlawful hazardous waste site. 167 
The court held that the term "person" within the meaning of CER-
CLA should be liberally interpreted to include both employees and 
the corporation. 168 The NEPACCO court also noted that, under the 
terms of section 107(a)(3), a defendant need not "actually own or 
possess the waste. "169 Rather, it is sufficient if the defendant has 
"direct supervision and knowledge of the disposal of" the hazardous 
waste. 170 Because the NEPACCO vice-president arranged for the 
transport and disposal of hazardous waste, he was liable under sec-
tion 107(a)(3) regardless of whether he personally owned or pos-
sessed the hazardous waste or the facility. 171 
The court found both the president and vice-president of NE-
PACCO liable under CERCLA section 107(a)(1),172 as owners and 
operators173 of a facility.174 The vice-president qualified as an owner 
and operator of NEPACCO because he was in charge of one of its 
plants and was a major stockholder actively participating in NE-
PACCO's management. 175 The president was also an "owner and 
operator" because he was a major stockholder who had "the capacity 
165 NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 846-50. 
166 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1982). 
167 NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 848. 
168 ld. 
169 ld. at 847. CERCLA § 107(c)(3) imposes liability upon: 
any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treat-
ment, or arranged with a transporter to transport for disposal or treatment, of 
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or 
entity at any facility owned or operated by another party or entity and containing 
such hazardous substances .... 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1982) (emphasis added). 
170 NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 847. 
171 ld. 
172 42 U. S. C. § 9607(a)(1) (1982). 
173 NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 848-49. Under CERCLA § 107(a)(l) "the owner and oper-
ator of . . . a facility" may be held liable for hazardous waste cleanup costs and for damages 
to natural resources. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (Supp. v 1981). "Owner and operator" is defined 
by CERCLA as "any person . .. owning or operating [aJ facility." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (A) 
(Supp. v 1981) (emphasis added). A "person" under CERCLA may be an " ... individual, 
firm [or aJ corporation .... " 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1982). 
174 See supra note 92. 
175 NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 848. 
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and general responsibility as president to control the disposal of 
hazardous waste."176 In holding the defendants liable under CER-
CLA, the district court noted: 
[t]he statute literally reads that a person who owns interest in 
a facility and is actively participating in its management can be 
held liable for the disposal of hazardous waste. Such a construc-
tion appears to be supported by the intent of Congress. CER-
CLA promotes the timely cleanup of inactive hazardous waste 
sites. It was designed to insure, so far as possible, that the 
parties responsible for the creation of hazardous waste sites be 
liable for the response costs in cleaning them up .... 177 
The NEPACCO court also emphasized that to allow the individual 
defendants to hide behind the corporate form would frustrate the 
purpose of CERCLA by exempting from the operation of the statute 
"a large class of persons . . . uniquely qualified to assume the burden 
[of hazardous waste cleanup]."178 
In a similar case, United States v. Mottolo,179 the Federal District 
Court of New Hampshire denied defendant's summary judgment 
motion and ruled that the president and principal stockholder of 
Lewis Chemical Corporation could be held liable under CERCLA 
section 107(a)(3) because he was a person who arranged for the 
disposal or transport for disposal of hazardous waste. ISO The court 
reasoned that a corporate officer who personally participates in the 
tortious activities of a corporation, and whose involvement is causally 
related to the alleged injury, is liable for those tortS. 181 The M ottolo 
court also noted that under CERCLA section 107(a)(3) the defendant 
need not own or possess the hazardous substances,182 but that his 
liability under the statute was premised on his involvement with the 
disposal of the hazardous substances. 183 
The M ottolo court also ruled that the defendant could be held 
liable under the alter ego theory of liability. 184 To pierce the corporate 
veil, however, the government would have to "allege with sufficient 
176 [d. at 849. 
177 [d. at 848. 
178 [d. at 849. 
179 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124 (D.S.C. 1984). 
180 [d. 
181 [d., citing FLETCHER, 3A CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1137. 
182 Mottola, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. at 1029. 
183 [d. 
184 [d. 
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particularity that [the defendant] had so dominated the corporation 
that it has no will or existence of its own. "185 
In United States v Carolawn Co. ,186 the Federal District Court of 
South Carolina held that three individuals who owned, operated, and 
were officers of a company operating a hazardous waste site could 
be subject to personal liability under CERCLA.187 The court held 
that the three individuals who owned the site were, under CERCLA 
section 107(a) , liable as "owners of a site which is the subject of a 
CERCLA response action [and] are liable to the government for 
response expenses. "188 The court held that, unless the three defen-
dants could raise one of the narrow affirmative defenses available 
under section 107(b) , 189 they may be held liable for the government's 
clean-up costs. 190 
The Carolawn court also found that two of the three defendants 
could be subject to CERCLA section 107 liability as operators of the 
site. 191 The court ruled that CERCLA contemplated individual lia-
bility under section 107, despite the possibility that the individuals 
operate in the corporate form. 192 The court stated that "to the extent 
that an individual has control or authority over the activities of a 
facility from which hazardous substances are released or participates 
in the management of such facility, he may be held liable for response 
costs incurred at a facility notwithstanding the corporate character 
of the business. "193 
In light of these decisions, the imposition of corporate officer 
liability under CERCLA turns on the level of involvement by the 
officer in the corporation's hazardous waste activity. Although cor-
porate officers generally are not personally liable for acts performed 
in their corporate capacity,l94 the corporate form will not shield 
corporate officers from liability for tortious or criminal activity. 195 
The few courts to construe corporate officer liability under CERCLA 
185 I d. Note that the Government need not pierce the corporate veil in order to hold an 
individual liable under CERCLA, so long as that individual is involved in the corporation's 
hazardous waste activity, he may be liable for the torts of the corporation. See N. Y. v. Shore 
Realty, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1625, 1641 (2d Cir. 1985). 
186 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124 (D.S.C. 1984). 
187Id. 
188 Id. at 2130. 
189 Id. See also supra notes 100-105 and accompanying text. 
100 Mottolo, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. at 2130. 
191 Id. at 2131. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 See supra notes 138 -157 and accompanying text. 
195Id. 
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section 107 have found such liability premised upon the statutory 
language of CERCLA, which specifically dictates that persons liable 
may include both individuals and corporations, and the general cor-
porate law principle that corporate officers may be liable for the 
torts of the corporation in which they participated. 196 Moreover, 
ownership of the hazardous waste, or of the waste facility itself, is 
not a prerequisite for a finding of section 107 liability.197 Thus, if a 
corporate officer or employee is directly involved in, or has authority 
over, the generation, transport, arranging for transport, or allowing 
the dumping of hazardous waste, he may be subject to personal 
liability under CERCLA section 107. 198 
3. Liability of Hazardous Waste Facility Owners 
The liability of owners under CERCLA section 107 differs from 
the liability of corporate officers because the element of personal 
participation in hazardous waste activity is not required to find 
liability. Section 107(a) subjects "the owner and operator of a ... 
facility" to liability for hazardous waste clean-up costS. 199 An owner 
or operator is defined by CERCLA as "any person owning or oper-
ating such facility."20o This does not, however, include a person who, 
without participating in the management of a facility, possesses 
"indicia of ownership" to protect a security interest in the facility. 201 
Consequently, courts have held that persons owning an interest in a 
facility may not be found liable under CERCLA unless they actively 
participate in its management. 202 Stockholders and secured creditors 
have fallen into this category.203 The general rule, however, is that 
ownership of a facility could result in liability under CERCLA. Such 
liability is not contingent upon any personal participation in the 
management of the facility. 204 
In Carolawn, individual owners of a business were subject to 
section 107 liability even though their business was incorporated. 205 
The court held that the three individuals who were the owners of 
196 See supra notes 159 -193 and accompanying text. 
197Id. 
198 Id. See also NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 845-50. 
199 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. v 1981). 
200 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20)(A) (Supp. v 1981). 
201Id. 
202 See NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 848. 
203 United States v. Mirabile, No. 84-2280, slip op. (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
204 See U.S. v. Argent Corp., No. 83-0523BB, slip op. (D.N.M. 1984). 
205 Carolawn, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. at 2130--31. 
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the hazardous waste site were liable under section 107(a) because 
they owned a facility which was the subject of a governmental re-
sponse action. 206 That two of the three individual defendants were 
also held liable as operators of the facility did not negate the fact 
that ownership alone was enough to support a liability finding under 
CERCLA.207 
The federal district court in New Mexico interpreted owner lia-
bility broadly in United States v. Argent.208 In Argent, the court 
denied defendant's summary judgment motion and ruled that a land-
ownerllessor may be liable as an "owner" under section 107(a).209 In 
Argent, the defendant leased a warehouse to Argent Corporation, a 
business that used hazardous chemicals to recover silver from used 
film.210 The defendant, who had no connection with the business, 
argued that mere ownership of the land, without any further con-
nection with the business, did not render him an owner of a facility 
within the meaning of CERCLA.211 The court rejected this conten-
tion and found instead that, as the undisputed owner of the land and 
building, the defendant was an owner susceptible to liability under 
CERCLA.212 
The Argent court based its decision on precedent,213 legislative 
history,214 and the statutory language. 215 First, the Argent court 
found that Carolawn and NEPACCO implicitly supported a finding 
that a landownerllessor may be liable as an owner under CER-
CLA.216 The Carolawn court had found three individual owners of 
land liable under CERCLA as owners of a waste facility.217 The 
NEPACCO court had noted that the owner of the waste site could 
have been joined by the other defendants as a co-defendant. 218 These 
opinions indicated that ownership of a hazardous waste site, without 
any further connection with the activity on the land, was sufficient 
to cause an individual to be found an owner within the meaning of 
2061d. 
2071d. 
208 Argent, No. 83-0523BB, slip op. (D.N.M. 1984). 
209 I d. at 3-4. 
210 Id. at 2. 
211 Id. at 2-3. 
212 I d. at 3-4. 




217 See supra note 30. 
218 NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 845, n.26. 
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CERCLA.219 Second, the Argent court noted that CERCLA's leg-
islative history indicated that Congress deliberately omitted from 
CERCLA language that would have required participation in the 
management or in the operation of the facility as a prerequisite to 
owner liability.220 Finally, the court noted that CERCLA's plain 
language supported its holding. 221 Section 107 explicitly subjects 
owners of hazardous waste sites to liability for cleanup, with no 
further requirement that they need to have participated in the actual 
disposal of hazardous waste. 222 
After determining that the defendant was an owner subject to 
section 107 liability, the Argent court ruled that he could not assert 
the "third party defense"223 set forth in section 107(b)(3).224 He was 
therefore not exempt from liability on the basis that the release or 
threat of release was caused by the act or omission of a third party. 225 
Section 107(b)(3) provides that a defendant may not assert a third 
party defense if the act or omission of that third party occurred in 
connection with a contractual relationship with the defendant. 226 In 
Argent, the Argent Corporation's production of hazardous waste 
occurred in connection with a lease agreement with the defendant. 227 
The district court thus held that the third party defense was un-
available. 228 
In New York v. Shore Realty COrp.,229 the federal district court 
in N ew York held that a corporate owner of land could be held liable 
under CERCLA for governmental cleanup230 costs where wastes 
were disposed of prior to, and for a short time subsequent to, the 
land purchase.231 The court in Shore implied that owners of land on 
which wastes had been disposed may be held liable for clean-up 
costs, even where the disposal occurred entirely before their pur-
chase.232 After finding the corporate owner of the waste site liable, 
219 See id.; Carolawn, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. at 2130. 
220 Argent, No. 83-0523BB, slip op. at 3. 
221 [d. at 3-4. 
= 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. v 1981). 
223 Argent, No. 83-0523BB, slip op. at 4; see also supra notes 103-105 and accompanying 
text. 
224 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (Supp. v 1981). 
225 [d. 
226 [d. 
227 Argent, No. 83-0523BB, slip op. at 4. 
228 [d. 
229 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1625 (2d Cir. 1985). 
230 See supra note 88. 
231 N.Y. v. Shore Realty, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. at 1637. 
232 [d. 
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the Shore court found another defendant, a corporate officer and 
major stockholder in the corporation, personally liable because he 
managed the corporation and was in charge of the operation of the 
waste site. 233 
As indicated by the court in Shore, CERCLA liability may attach 
to owners of waste sites on which all waste disposal occurred before 
their purchase of the land.234 The court found the potential for such 
liability in United States v. Mirabile. 235 In Mirabile, a federal district 
court in Pennsylvania ruled, among other things, that individual 
landowners who purchased land upon which hazardous waste had 
been previously disposed could be held liable under section 107.236 
The court ruled, however, that subsequent landowners could escape 
liability if they are able to establish the section 107(b)(3) third party 
defense.237 The Mirabile court stated that "a common sense reading 
of the statute suggests that the defense would be potentially avail-
able to a party who can establish that he purchased property on 
which hazardous wastes were placed by others and that he did not 
add to those wastes. "238 To escape liability, the subsequent landown-
ers would also have to establish that they exercised due care with 
respect to the waste and that they took precautions against foresee-
able acts or omissions of others. 239 
In sum, the only prerequisite to owner liability under CERCLA 
is ownership of a hazardous waste site that the government or some 
other party has responded to and incurred clean-up costS.240 Own-
ership that triggers CERCLA liability may be occasioned at either 
the time of the disposal of the hazardous wastes or at the time the 
233 [d. at 1640-41. The Shore court relied on NEPACCO and Carolawn as authority on the 
issue of defendant Leo Grande's personal liability. [d. at 1640. 
234 See Shore, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. at 1639. Subsequent landowner liability was found under 
RCRA in U.S. v. Price (Price I). 523 F. Supp. 1055. In Price [, the federal district court in 
New Jersey held that the defendants' purchase of land years after hazardous waste was 
dumped on it, subjected them to liability pursuant to section 7003 of RCRA. [d. at 1073. The 
Price [ court held that, under the terms of the statute, the defendants contributed to the 
current environmental hazard by virtue of their "studied indifference" to the situation. [d. 
The Price [ court was persuaded by the fact that the defendants were aware at the time of 
their purchase that hazardous wastes had been dumped on the property. The court stated: 
"[slubsequent owners [arelliable unless they 'could not reasonably be expected to have actual 
knowledge of the pretense of hazardous waste at such facility or site and its potential for 
release'." [d. at 1076 quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6934(b). 





240 See generally id. at 1632--37; Argent, No. 83-0523BB, slip op. at 1-5. 
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cleanup of such wastes occurs.241 Liability may be excused, however, 
if the defendant successfully asserts one of the section 107(b)(3) 
defenses, in particular the third party defense.242 Moreover, CER-
CLA treats outright ownership and more attenuated interests in 
land differently. For liability to attach to a corporate stockholder or 
a secured creditor, that party must have participated in the hazard-
ous waste activity, either directly, or through participation in the 
facility's management.243 
IV. ANALYSIS OF PERSONAL LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA 
SECTION 107 
The liability provisions of CERCLA reach individuals who may 
be unaware that they could be subject to liability. Such individuals 
fall into two categories: (1) corporate officers and employees; and (2) 
owners of land on which hazardous waste is located. 244 Both of these 
groups of potential defendants in a section 107 cost recovery action 
often argue that they should be exempt from liability. Corporate 
officers and employees argue the limited liability of the corporate 
form protects them.245 Landowners who are not involved with the 
hazardous waste producing activity also argue that they should not 
be subject to liability for the misconduct of others.246 Both these 
arguments have failed due to the broad judicial construction of lia-
bility under CERCLA section 107.247 
The perceived harshness of individual liability under CERCLA is 
justified by the seriousness of the nation's hazardous waste problem 
and by the need to clean up hazardous waste sites. 248 Imposing 
personal liability may be necessary to ensure that the federal gov-
ernment reaches a "deep pocket" to finance clean-up costs. This is 
particularly true where a corporate defendant is insolvent but its 
major stockholders and officers have access to capital. In fact, to 
date, most of the CERCLA decisions addressing personal liability 
of corporate officers have involved close corporations. 249 In close 
241 Mirabile, No. 84-2280, slip op. 
242Id. 
243 See NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 848. 
244 See supra notes 159 -243 and accompanying text. 
245 See NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 847. 
246 See generally Argent, No. 83-0523BB, slip op. 
247 See supra notes 159 -243 and accompanying text. 
248 See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text. 
249 See Mirabile, No. 84-2280, slip. op. 
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corporations, stock is not usually publicly distributed. Close corpo-
rations are not formed to gather public investment, but rather, to 
secure the benefits of operating in the corporate form, including the 
advantages of limited liability. To allow individuals to hide behind 
the corporate shield to escape liability frustrates CERCLA's regu-
latory purpose. 
Historically legislation enacted to protect the public health has 
been construed to permit the effectuation of the regulatory purpose 
despite resulting hardship to individual defendants. 25o This has oc-
curred largely with respect to federal regulatory laws under which 
courts traditionally have permitted a less demanding showing of 
criminal culpability in order to promote the regulatory purpose for 
which they were enacted. 251 Such statutes often involve the handling 
of dangerous substances by persons who should be aware of the 
public regulatory laws pertaining to them.252 These substances have 
included items covered by the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
Act, and more recently, hazardous waste as covered by RCRA.253 
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act254 is designed to protect 
the public from impure food and drugs. It provides that persons who 
introduce impure food or drugs into interstate commerce may be 
guilty of a misdemeanor.255 Liability under that Act reaches both 
individuals and corporations, and it dispenses with the conventional 
intent requirement for criminal liability.256 In fact, the Court, in its 
decision in United States v. Dotterweich,257 stated: 
In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of acting 
upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in a responsible 
relation to a public danger .... Balancing relative hardships, 
Congress has preferred to place it upon those who have at least 
the opportunity of informing themselves of the existence of con-
ditions imposed for the protections of consumers before sharing 
in illicit commerce, rather than to throw the hazard on the in-
nocent public who are totally helpless. 258 
250 See e.g., U.S. v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); U.S. v. Dotterweich. 320 U.S. 277 (1943); 
U.S. v. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d 662, 666 (1984). 
251 See Individual Liability Under Federal Hazardous Waste Laws, Memorandum of the 
Machinery & Allied Products Institute (December 1982). 
252 Id. 
253 See id. 
254 21 U.S.C.S. §§ 301 et. seq. 
255 42 U.S.C.S. § 331(k). 
256 See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 668 (1975). 
257 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 272 (1943). 
258 I d. at 283. 
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Liability under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act is thus not prem-
ised upon a defendant's position in the corporate hierarchy, but 
rather upon "his accountability, because of the responsibility and 
authority of his position, for the conditions which gave rise to the 
charges against him. "259 
The public interest in regulating hazardous waste is no less press-
ing than that of regulating the purity of food and drugs. In United 
States v. Johnson & Towers Inc. ,260 the court compared the criminal 
provisions of RCRA to those under the Food and Drug Act consid-
ered in Dotterweich. 261 The court concluded that Congress intended 
in RCRA, as in the Food and Drug Act, to control hazards from 
which the public was unable to protect itself.262 The Johnson & 
Towers court noted that it would "undercut the purposes of the 
legislation" to limit the class of potential defendants in a hazardous 
waste case to less than all of those who bear a responsibility for 
handling hazardous materials. 263 
Although the above cases deal with criminal liability, courts may 
apply the same rationale to the imposition of civil liability under 
CERCLA. In each case, when balancing the relative hardships in-
volved, Congress concluded that the interest of the general public 
in cleaning up hazardous waste sites outweighed the incidental hard-
ships upon individual defendants.264 To facilitate the necessary 
cleanup of dangerous hazardous waste sites, Congress chose to cast 
a wide net of liability upon all those parties responsible, including 
individuals, for the creation of these sites. 265 Individuals subject to 
liability include those operating within a corporate structure as well 
as landowners whose involvement with the hazardous waste activity 
upon their land may be negligible. These parties may be held culp-
able under CERCLA because they, as opposed to the generally 
innocent public, stand in a responsible position to a known danger. 266 
Congress thus decided to place the financial hardship for hazardous 
waste cleanup upon the parties who had actual control over hazard-
ous wastes. 267 
259 Park, 421 U.S. at 675. 
260 741 F.2d 662 (3rd Cir. 1984). 
261 [d. at 666. 
262 [d. at 667. 
263 [d. 
264 See S. REP. No. 848, supra note 1, at 13. 
265 [d. at 31. 
266 [d. at 13. 
267 [d. 
1986] CERCLA SECTION 207 671 
V. CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted CERCLA to respond to the growing dangers 
posed by hazardous waste sites, especially those which are "inactive" 
and which are the result of past improper waste disposal practices. 
CERCLA authorizes the federal government to clean up hazardous 
waste sites that pose dangers to the environment, using funds from 
the statutorily created Superfund. The government may bring suit 
to recover the costs of such clean-up operations from responsible 
parties. The responsible parties may be both individuals and/or cor-
porate defendants. 
Individual defendants have sought to escape liability under CER-
CLA by asserting that the corporate form limits the liability of 
individuals for acts taken on behalf of the corporation. Courts have 
rejected this argument, and have premised individual liability upon 
involvement by the individual in illegal or tortious acts of the cor-
poration. Courts have also given extreme deference to the express 
congressional intent to hold culpable individuals liable for clean-up 
expenses. 
Individual liability of owners of hazardous waste sites, as opposed 
to the other actors who may be defendants in a CERCLA liability 
action, is not premised upon actual involvement in the practice of 
hazardous waste disposal unless the ownership is in the form of a 
security interest. Individual or corporate owners of land on which 
hazardous wastes are located may not claim exemption from liability 
on the grounds that they were not involved in the dumping of the 
hazardous waste. These defendants would have to establish under 
the section 107 third party defense that they were completely with-
out fault to be excused from liability. 
Congress granted the federal government the power to clean up 
dangerous hazardous waste sites and placed the financial burden for 
the cleanup upon the parties who own or have participated in the 
creation of the sites. These parties include both the corporations 
responsible for the hazardous waste problem and the individuals 
through whom the corporations have acted. 
